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ABSTRACT 
One of the traditional functions of party members is to campaign on 
behalf of their party at general elections.  However, they are not the only 
people who volunteer for the job.  Indeed, there is evidence to suggest 
that non-members who strongly support a party may do even more than 
those who actually join it.  This paper examines how different actors 
contributed to the electoral campaigns of six parties at the 2015 UK 
General Election. It uses new survey data covering not only members of 
the Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, United Kingdom 
Independence, Scottish Nationalist, and Green parties but also, firstly, 
voters who identified themselves as being close to one of those parties but 
did not formally belong to them and, secondly, those belonging to trade 
unions officially affiliated to the Labour Party. As well as exploring how 
much work they do during campaigns, we ask whether the three groups 
choose different activities and are differently motivated. We find that, at 
the individual level, party members do more than union members or 
non-member supporters, and that this is especially true of more intensive 
forms of activity. We also find that constituency context and political 
attitudes influence levels of activity, although there is no consistent 
impact from demographic factors. At the aggregate level, we estimate that 
the campaign work done by supporters and trade union members may 
match or even exceed that done by party members. 
  
Introduction 
A good ground game may not be everything but it still means something. In a 
tight race, it may even mean the difference between a party winning and losing 
an election, especially in the UK, a country carved up into single-member 
constituencies operating under the plurality rule (Johnston and Pattie, 2003; 
Karp, Banducci and Bowler, 2008; Fisher and Denver, 2009; André and 
Depauw, 2015; Johnston, Pattie, Scully and Cutts, 2016).  But if ‘boots on the 
ground’ are at least potentially important, who is it who wears them and why?  
And what exactly do they do once they’ve donned them? 
 
The answer to the first question has traditionally been obvious: grassroots 
members of political parties.  The answer to the second no less so: delivering 
leaflets, putting up posters, holding meetings and canvassing voters and then 
getting them to the polling stations.  But what if all this no longer holds?  Given 
(a) the almost ubiquitous decline in the number of people joining political 
parties (van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012), (b) those parties’ more or 
possibly less (Faucher, 2015) reluctant accommodation to that decline,  and (c) 
the simultaneous rise of new communication technologies, there is good reason 
to suppose things might have changed.  There is also some evidence to suggest 
that they have. 
 
A recent British study, using data collected in 2010 from parties’ election agents, 
found, for instance, that ‘although members clearly still matter, they are not the 
only source of voluntary activity, especially in election campaigns’ – so much so 
that ‘[o]ver three quarters of constituency (district level) campaigns in Britain 
recruited supporters in 2010 and on average, supporters engaged in around two 
thirds of the activities of members’ (Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2014: 91-2; 
see also Scarrow, 2015: 103-109 and, on Australia, Gauja and Jackson 2015: 9-
12).  And while another recent study discovered that the British lag some way 
behind their American cousins when it comes to contacting voters online, it also 
noted that the potential is clearly there (Aldrich et al., forthcoming). It is more 
than possible, of course, that these two things are related in the sense of new 
technologies enabling and perhaps even encouraging campaigning activity by 
people who are not necessarily members of the party with which they identify 
(see Gibson, 2015). 
 
In a recent paper (Bale, Webb and Poletti, 2015), we made use of surveys of the 
members of six British political parties conducted just after the 2015 general 
election not just to detail what they did for their parties during the campaign but 
also to explain what drove them to do what they did. At the same time as 
conducting those surveys, however, we also surveyed some of the same parties’ 
strongest supporters – people who felt a strong sense of partisan identification 
but who were not themselves members – as well as members of trade unions 
affiliated to the Labour Party. Our aim in this paper is, firstly, to compare the 
scope, frequency and intensity of the campaigning activities of the three groups 
and, secondly, to see whether they are similarly or differently motivated.  In 
general, we find that at the individual level party members are much more likely 
to campaign for their preferred parties than either union members or non-
member supporters, and that this is especially true of the more intensive forms of 
activity. We also find that constituency context (ie, the marginality of a seat) and 
the political attitudes of respondents (especially social liberalism, 
postmaterialism and feelings about the EU) influence levels of activity, although 
demographic factors bear no consistent connection with it. This notwithstanding, 
however, the considerably greater numbers of non-member supporters and trade 
unionists in the population mean that the sum of campaign activity undertaken 
by these groups may match or even outweigh that of party members at the 
aggregate level. 
 
Members and supporters at elections: What we know 
The most recent and the most detailed study so far of the contributions made at 
elections by both members and supporters of British political parties is the 
research carried out, using surveys of constituency parties at the 2010 election, 
by Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2014) – work which builds both upon the work 
of Denver, Hands and Fisher (2001), and on the seminal work on British party 
members of Paul Whiteley and Patrick Seyd.  The main argument put forward by 
Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2014: 79) is that ‘many of the roles of members 
outlined by Seyd and Whiteley may now not be their exclusive preserve’, not 
least because ‘supporters can become involved in election campaigns, assisting 
with the mobilization of the vote and political communication.’ They also note 
(2014: 77) that, in particular, ‘Labour’s party structure, which includes affiliated 
trade unions, suggests that an exclusive focus on formal individual members 
could be missing something.’ Observing that in 2010 ‘78 per cent of local 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties recruited some supporters to 
help with the campaign’ (Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2014: 81), they asked 
four key questions (the first and the last two being of most interest to us), 
namely: 
 
1. To what extent do supporters engage in similar activities to those of members? 
2. To what extent is supporter activity a function of existing active local parties? 
3. Are the levels [of] supporter activity predicted in a similar way to levels of 
member activity? 
4. Do supporters make an independent positive contribution to constituency 
campaigns? 
When it came to the first question, they found the following (p.83): 
On the one hand, it is clear that to some extent, party supporters 
engaged to varying degrees in the same activities as party 
members, and in the case of delivering leaflets (the activity in 
which all parties made most effort), to a virtually identical degree. 
Equally, supporters were quite likely to staff polling stations 
relative to members, and were perhaps surprisingly likely to be 
involved at the campaign headquarters, despite not being formal 
members. However, in respect of other activities where voters 
were contacted either on the doorstep or by telephone, supporters 
were less likely to be involved than members. 
They concluded (2014: 84) that, ‘on average, [supporters put in] around two 
thirds of the effort’ and that this was plainly ‘nontrivial’. 
As to whether the levels [of] supporter activity could be predicted in a similar 
way to levels of member activity, they found that the prospect of victory or 
possible defeat in a seat prompted more activity from both members and 
supporters (Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2014: 86).  When, however, it came to 
demographics (which they examined at a constituency level, note, not at an 
individual level), they found that there was no consistent pattern across 
members and supporters, or across the various parties. For the Conservatives, 
the proportions of graduates and owner occupiers in a constituency predicted 
the campaign input of members, while the proportion of manual workers 
influenced the activity of supporters. For Labour, an ethnically diverse 
population was a significant predictor of member activity, but population 
density correlated with supporter activity. Several features of the constituency’s 
demographic profile (an ethnically diverse population and proportions of 
graduates, owner-occupiers and council or housing association tenants) 
impacted on the campaign activity of Liberal Democrat supporters – but none of 
these mattered to the party’s members (ibid., 86-89). They also picked up 
differences due to what they refer to as ‘political’ drivers, by which they meant 
the presence of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) candidates (which boosted 
Conservative supporter activity but not member activity) or women candidates 
(which correlated positively with Labour members’ activism, but not with that of 
their supporters).  
 
To these findings, we can now add our own on the campaign activities of party 
members at the 2015 election – data gathered not at the level of constituency 
parties but at the level of the individual members and supporters themselves. In 
an earlier study, we used the party members’ data to test a number of 
hypotheses, some of which are derived from Seyd and Whiteley’s ‘general 
incentives’ model (Bale, Webb & Poletti 2015). Along with certain attitudinal, 
demographic and constituency variables, the general incentives factors largely 
performed well in explaining the activism of British party members; even if 
some elements of it (such as altruistic incentives and the costs of activism) 
appeared unimportant, others (social norms, expressive and selective incentives) 
were consistently significant. The personal resources inherent in socio-economic 
status were generally unimportant, although in several parties, age had a 
(curvilinear) impact, and there was also an association between education and 
participation. Various ideological influences also impacted on campaign 
activism. In particular, social liberalism and, to a lesser extent, post-materialism 
were consistently positive drivers of campaign activism among party members, 
as were attitudes towards EU membership – at least for those who have definite 
opinions on the issue. In addition, a member’s perceptions of left-right 
proximity from his or her local party could significantly enhance (or depress) 
that member’s willingness to engage in campaign activity.  The local 
constituency context was also an influence on activism: a close contest made 
members more active. 
 
In principle, we would like in this paper to test similar models on non-member 
supporters and members of trade unions that are affiliated to the Labour Party. 
However, it is not possible to run identical models for these groups since many 
of the survey questions on which the general incentives models are based – 
relating to reasons for joining parties, for instance – are plainly irrelevant to 
those who are not party members. We are perforce obliged to test somewhat 
more limited models of activism which can be applied equally to all three groups 
of actors. These models incorporate demographic, ideological and constituency 
factors, but exclude the general incentives reasons for joining parties. 
 
Given the above, then, we aim in this paper to test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Individuals who are members of political parties will, on average, do more 
for those parties during election campaigns than will individuals who strongly 
support those same parties but are not members of them. 
 
H2: Individuals who are members of trade unions affiliated to the Labour Party 
will, on average, do more for the parties they voted for in 2015 during election 
campaign than will individuals who strongly support those same parties but are 
not members of them, but they will do less than formal members of those 
parties. We expect union members to fall into this intermediate position 
because, as people who participate in civil society associations, they get the 
chance to develop the skills relevant to political participation (Verba, Schlozman 
and Brady, 1995); however, they are not all individual party members, and so as 
a group it would be surprising if they showed the same degree of commitment to 
party activity as full individual party members.  
 
H3: Notwithstanding the greater propensity of party members to undertake 
campaign activity than non-member supporters or affiliated trade unionists at 
the individual level, we would estimate that the aggregate-level input of the 
latter two groups may match or exceed that of party members because of their 
greater numbers in the adult population.  
 
H4: Differences in campaigning effort between party members, party supporters 
and members of affiliated trade unions will vary according to the activities in 
question: members will be even more likely than others to engage in ‘high-
intensity’ and ‘medium-intensity’ activities; differences with regard to ‘low-
intensity’ campaign activities will be less pronounced.  
 
H5: The demographic and attitudinal correlates of campaign activism among 
parties’ strongest supporters and members of affiliated trade unions will be the 
same as, or at least similar to, the correlates of campaign activism among 
parties’ members. 
 
H6: Party members, strong supporters of political parties and members of 
Labour-affiliated trade unions will all be more likely to involve themselves in 
campaign activities when they live in constituencies which are likely to produce 
closer races. 
 
Patterns of campaign activism among party members, supporters 
and trade unionists  
Table 1 reports some basic descriptive statistics relating to the demographic and 
political profile of our samples, comparing party members, non-member 
partisan identifiers (‘supporters’), and members of Labour-affiliated trade 
unions. We observe few differences across these three sets of respondents in 
terms of their age profiles, although there is a slight tendency for union 
members to be a little older than party members and partisans; this is most 
marked in the case of Green voters.  It is also apparent that party members and 
trade unionists are more likely to be male than their counterparts among wider 
supporter networks; indeed, the differences are quite sharp in all cases. The only 
groups that show female majorities are Green and Liberal Democrat partisan 
supporters. Party members are, on average, much more likely to be educated to 
graduate level than non-member partisans or trade union supporters, with 
Labour, Liberal Democrat and Greens being the most highly educated in these 
terms, and Ukippers the least. Party members are also generally more likely to 
be from non-manual occupational grades than other supporters and trade 
unionists; Liberal Democrats and Conservatives are most middle-class in this 
sense, and once again, Ukippers are the least. In terms of subjective self-location 
on the left-right scale, it is striking but perhaps not too surprising, that party 
members are, without exception, more radical (in the sense of being closer to 
one end of the ideological spectrum or the other) than either their supporter or 
trade unionist counterparts: that is, Labour, Green, SNP and even Liberal 
Democrat members all regard themselves as more left–wing than their 
respective parties’ partisans and trade unionist supporters, while Conservative 
and UKIP members are both further right than their equivalents. The relative 
ordering of mean scores for the parties is identical within each of samples: from 
left to right it runs from Green to Labour, SNP, Liberal Democrat, UKIP and 
Conservative. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A clear indication of the way in which party membership, partisan identification 
and  trade union membership can help mobilize electoral support is provided by 
reviewing the evidence on voting behaviour in 2015. First, Table 2 shows the 
effect of partisan identification by reporting the percentages of those voting 
loyally for the party with which they habitually identify; the data come from the 
British Election Study rather than our party membership survey because the 
former enables us to see the effect of the strength of partisan sentiment: it is 
quite clear that in the case of each one of the parties, the stronger a respondent 
professes his or her partisan identity to be, the more likely they are to vote 
loyally for ‘their’ party in the actual election. Our own sample of non-member 
supporters of parties consists of only those with very strong partisan identities. 
Table 3 confirms generally similar rates of electoral loyalty in our data, but also 
reveals that – with the exception of the SNP – party members are even more 
loyal to their party than non-member partisans. Finally, Table 3 shows how 
membership of an affiliated trade union still helps Labour in particular, 
although the  relationship is far from perfect; nearly one in two union members 
voted for Labour in 2015, although each of the other parties won non-trivial 
levels of support from union members as well, especially UKIP and the Tories. 
 
TABLES 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
These figures point towards some kind of general mobilizational advantage for 
parties in having members and strong partisan identifiers, and a specific Labour 
Party mobilizational advantage in having affiliated union members as well. But 
what are the mobilizational efforts that each of these groups of actors undertake 
on behalf of their parties? Table 4 addresses this question by revealing the range 
and number of campaign activities that they undertook in the run-up to the 
election in May 2015. The most striking feature of this table is that, as one might 
expect, full members of political parties are far more active on average than their 
counterparts among non-member supporters or trade unionists. The summary 
campaign activism index scores for the party member samples range from a low 
of 2.15 forms of activity undertaken during the campaign by Conservative 
members to 3.02 forms of activity undertaken by SNP members; by contrast, 
respective figures for supporters are 0.26 to 0.81, and for trade unionists they 
are 0.26 to 1.06. The overall activism index average for party members is 2.47, 
compared to just 0.51 for supporters and 0.81 for union members. Thus, we can 
confidently conclude that party members remain vitally important campaign 
resources for political parties, who are much more readily mobilized on behalf of 
their candidates during elections. This clearly confirms H1 (that members will be 
more active than supporters). Furthermore, we see that overall, affiliated trade 
union members are more active than supporters, but not as active as party 
members, which confirms H2. It is interesting to observe that the difference 
between supporters and union members in activism index scores is most 
pronounced in the case of those who worked on behalf of the Labour Party: 
while the respective scores for these groups were 0.51 and 0.81 overall, for those 
who were active on behalf of Labour the scores were 0.48 and 1.13 – a much 
larger gap than for any other party.  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, while this is undeniably true when we compare the relative rates of 
activity undertaken by these three groups, it must be borne in mind that the 
story may be quite different when we consider their overall impact on election 
campaigns at the aggregate level. That is, we have to take into account the fact 
that in Britain, as is the case throughout Europe (see Hooghe and Kern, 2015: 
953) there are very different absolute numbers of party members, non-member 
supporters and affiliated trade union members. Given that there are 
considerably more of each of the latter two groups than there are party members 
in the adult population, it is quite conceivable that their overall contribution to 
campaign activity might rival that of party members. A few simple calculations 
suffices to provide us with estimates of the overall input of each group in the 
2015 general election.   
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 estimates the numbers of each of these groups that the parties were able 
to draw on as potential campaign resources in the run-up to the election. The 
number of members that each party had in May 2015 (or as close as possible to 
that time) is taken from Keen (2015). The number of non-member supporters 
each party might have been able to call upon is estimated by taking the 
percentages of the overall BES post-election sample who are ‘very strong’ 
partisans for each party, and then calculating what this would amount to in 
terms of the UK’s 45,325,078 registered electors in 2015.  The numbers of trade 
unionists supporting each party are calculated by allocating the 4,238,492 
members of trade unions affiliated to Labour in 2015 on a pro rata basis 
according to the levels of voting support reported in Table 3 (final row). Given 
that there are more than 8.8 million very strong partisans in the electorate (just 
under a fifth), compared to around 4 million members of affiliated unions and 
just 600,000 party members, it is obvious that the parties might enjoy 
considerable activist input at the aggregate level from the first two of these 
groups, notwithstanding their much lower rates of campaign activity at the 
individual level.   
 
Just how much is shown in Table 6, which multiplies the mean score on the 
campaign activism index by the number of people in each group. The figures can 
be interpreted as estimates of the total number of campaign activities performed 
by party members, non-member partisans, and trade union supporters 
respectively on behalf of ‘their’ parties. Regarded in this way, it is apparent that 
non-member supporters probably contributed most activity overall during the 
2015 election campaign, having performed a total of 4.5 million activities 
altogether. Members of affiliated trade unions came next, having performed 
more than 3.3 million campaign activities, while party members came last, with 
just under 1.5 million activities. Labour in particular seems to have benefited 
from the input of non-member supporters and (unsurprisingly) affiliated trade 
union members. This confirms one of the major claims made by Fisher and his 
colleagues about the importance of non-members for campaigning activity, and 
also confirms our own H3: ‘Notwithstanding the greater propensity of party 
members to undertake campaign activity than non-member supporters or 
affiliated trade unionists at the individual level, we would estimate that the 
aggregate-level input of the latter two groups may match or exceed that of party 
members because of their greater numbers in the adult population.’ 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Of course, none of this takes account of the specific nature of different types of 
campaign activity: close inspection of the pattern of the findings reported in 
Table 4 reveals that the members are at a particular premium when it comes to 
the more intensive forms of campaign activity such as canvassing and delivering 
leaflets. For instance, whereas party members were only 2.5 times more likely 
than non-member supporters to have ‘liked’ something for their party on 
Facebook, they were 12 times more likely to have canvassed and 15 times more 
likely to have delivered campaign leaflets. In order to look at this more 
systematically, we have distinguished between low-intensity, medium-intensity 
and high-intensity activities, and have included three lines in Table 4 which 
summarize participation in these terms. In terms of time and effort, our 
classification of low intensity activities includes ‘liking something by 
party/candidate on Facebook’, ‘Tweeting/re-tweeting something by party or 
candidate’ and ‘displaying election poster in window’; our medium-intensity 
activity category includes ‘delivering leaflets’ and ‘attending public meetings or 
hustings’; while our high intensity category includes ‘canvassing face to face or 
by phone’ and ‘standing as a candidate (parliamentary or local councillor)’. The 
general impression does not change. For instance, whereas party members were 
about 2.5 times more likely to have participated in low intensity activity than 
trade unionists or party supporters, they were respectively 3 and 6 times more 
likely to have participated in medium intensity activity, and (almost) 4 and 12 
times more likely to have participated in high intensity activity. Clearly, then, the 
higher the ‘cost’ to the individual in terms of time and effort, the more likely that 
party members rather than non-members or trade unionists will deliver 
campaign activity on behalf of their parties. This offers broad confirmation of 
H4, that the gap between members and supporters or trade unionists will grow 
with the intensity of campaign activity. Once again, moreover, we note that the 
relative ordering of the three groups places trade union members above non-
member supporters, but below party members. 
 
In brief, while this analysis confirms the ‘multi-speed membership’ idea that 
adherents who are more loosely connected to parties than full members may be 
valuable as human resources in election campaigns, it also points to the 
continuing centrality of the formal membership for core activities which are vital 
to electoral mobilization.  
 
Modelling activism: Are members and non-members motivated by 
the same factors? 
We now turn to the question of what influences campaign activism. In order to 
do this we create models of activism that enable us to compare and contrast the 
factors that motivate and influence members, supporters and trade unionist to 
campaign during elections. Specifically, we look at socio-demographic (H5), 
ideological (H5) and constituency marginality (H6) factors. 
 Hypothesis 5 states that ‘The demographic and attitudinal correlates of 
campaign activism among parties’ strongest supporters and members of 
affiliated trade unions will be the same as, or at least similar to, the correlates of 
campaign activism among parties’ members.’ On the one hand, the socio-
demographic determinants for activism are measured by looking at gender, 
educational qualification level, social grade, and age. Note that in addition to a 
straightforward linear age effect, we also test for a curvilinear effect, following 
the findings of previous research on political participation; Milbrath (1965: 135) 
suggests that older respondents are generally more participative up to a certain 
age, past which their activism declines again. i Our assumptions are that the 
most active during the campaign will be those who are higher educated, male, of 
high social grade, older up to their forties or fifties, after which age activism will 
decline again.  
 
Ideological determinants of activism are measured using various attitudinal 
scales which tap ideological dimensions widely recognised as salient features of 
contemporary British politics:  
 
(a) Left/right ideological proximity is measured by taking the absolute 
difference between respondents’ left-right self-position and that which they 
ascribe to their national party (both measured on a 0=left to 10=right scale). 
The measure of proximity runs from zero (maximum ideological proximity; 
i.e. no distance between respondent and party) to 10 (minimum ideological 
proximity; i.e. maximum distance between respondent and party). We 
assume that those who perceive a higher distance between themselves and 
their party will be less willing to campaign on behalf of it. 
 
(b) Social liberalism-authoritarianism is measured by a standard additive index 
running from zero (representing the liberal end of the scale) to 10 
(representing the authoritarian end) (Heath et al 1993). This is highly 
reliable.ii  Our assumption here is that respondents who are more socially 
liberal will be more likely to participate in campaigns, since liberalism places 
greater emphasis on democratic engagement as a civic right and a preferred 
value that maximises liberty and enhances political knowledge on the part of 
citizens (Howarth 2007).  
 
(c) Post-materialism is measured through an index that uses a classic 
Inglehartian measurement based on four policy objectives about which 
respondents are invited to express their preferencesiii. Respondents selecting 
the two materialist options as their first and second priorities are designated 
materialists (coded as 1), while those selecting the two post-materialist 
options are designated as post-materialists (coded as 3), and everyone else is 
deemed to be attitudinally ‘mixed’ on this dimension of belief (coded as 2). 
Since post-materialist values emphasise, among other things, self-
actualization and self-expression through democratic participation we would 
expect to find a positive relationship between post-materialist orientation 
and campaign activism. 
 
 
(d) Attitude towards Britain’s relationship with Europe is measured by a 
question about the referendum on UK membership of the EU:  ‘If there were 
a referendum on EU membership prior to the next general election, how 
would respondents vote?’ If they indicated a preference for leaving or staying 
in regardless of any renegotiated terms of membership that the government 
might achieve, they were coded as 1; if they indicated that their decision 
would depend on the outcome of negotiations they were coded as 0. This 
follows the assumption that those with less conditional opinions on EU 
membership will be more likely to participate across a wider range of 
campaign activities.  
 
Hypothesis 6 states that ‘Party members, strong supporters of political parties 
and members of Labour-affiliated trade unions will all be more likely to involve 
themselves in campaign activities when they live in constituencies which are 
likely to produce closer races.’ In order to determine whether a race is close we 
should look at marginality, measured using the winning majority of the local 
MP in 2010, with an index that runs from zero (0% majority) to 10 (100% 
majority).iv 
 
Our main dependent variable is the summary campaign activism index score 
used above (running from zero to seven and based on the number of different 
activities carried out), which aims to capture the breadth of party members’ 
political participation at the 2015 general election.v  We treat it as a count 
variable and run Negative Binomial regression analysis on it, the most 
appropriate statistical analysis tool for count outcome (Long 1997).vi 
 
 In table 7 we run equivalent models for members, party partisans and trade 
unionists that incorporate these demographics (H5), ideological factors (H5), 
and constituency marginality (H6). In each of these models, using SNP as the 
reference category, we include dummy variables for the party to which 
respondents belong (for party members), strongly identify with (for party 
supporters) or voted for in 2015 (for trade unionists), in order to control for  
party effects. Table 7 reports the Incident-Rate Ratio coefficients (IRRs), which 
are the key parameter estimates for negative binomial regression.vii  
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
We can see in Table 7 that there are few if any demographic characteristics that 
significantly influence campaign activism across the three groups of respondent; 
to this extent they are somewhat similar. However, where there are significant 
demographic effects, they differ across the groups. For party members (Model 1) 
the relevant characteristic is age. On average, and controlling for all other 
variables in the model, the older members are, the wider the range of campaign 
activities they participate in. This is true, however, until their forties, when their 
participation in campaign activities starts to decline. For party supporters 
(Model 2), however, it is gender and education that make the difference, rather 
than age. Higher educated respondents and females tends to participate more 
than lower educated respondents and men. Demographic characteristics seem to 
be of no importance at all for members of the trade unions affiliated to the 
Labour party (Model 3). Note that the general inconsistency of demographic 
effects is similar to that reported in the constituency-levels analysis of Fisher et 
al (2014). 
 When we look at ideology, we can see that all three groups participate more 
during the electoral campaign when they have clearer views on the EU and have 
more libertarian values. This is particularly the case for trade unionists. Being 
more post-materialist than materialist seems to matter for party members as 
well as party supporters, but not for trade unionists. Finally, the perceived 
distance between the respondent’s left-right self-placement and ‘their’ national 
party matters both for party members and party supporters, although in 
different directions: the greater the distance, the lower the participation of party 
members in the campaign, which makes intuitive sense and is as we expected; 
somewhat paradoxically, however, greater perceived ideological distance 
actually seems to spur non-member supporters to a wider range of participatory 
activities. Overall, the findings pertaining to demographic and attitudinal 
influences suggest that it is rather too simplistic to assert that they are broadly 
similar across party members, supporters and trade unionists; while there are 
some areas of overlap (especially in respect of social liberalism, post-materialism 
and European integration), the picture is too complex for us to accept H5. 
 
When we look at the marginality of the constituency respondents live in, we see 
that the safer a seat is, the less inclined both party members and party 
supporters are to participate in the campaign. However, marginality does not 
make a significant difference to the campaign involvement of trade unionists. 
Overall, there is clearly much evidence to support H6, although it is not entirely 
confirmed. 
 
Finally, everything else being equal, members and non-members of every party 
participated in significantly fewer activities than members and supporters of the 
SNP. The gap with SNP participation becomes particularly evident for Liberal 
Democrat and Conservative party supporters, and, to a lesser extent, for Labour 
and UKIP supporters. Similar differences between parties are found for trade 
unionists, with the exception that those who voted Labour and UKIP in 2015 
participated in the campaign as much as those who voted for SNP. Although 
none of the models display a particularly high fitviii, the fit of the trade unionists’ 
model (model 3) is comparatively higher than the fit of party supporters (model 
2), which, in turn, is comparatively higher than the fit of party members (model 
1). 
 
By way of summarizing our findings pertaining to hypotheses 5 and 6, it may be 
useful to tot up the points of difference across the three groups of respondent. 
Underlying both hypotheses is the implication that we should find parameter 
estimates that are similarly signed and of similar statistical significance. The 
evidence of Table 7 shows that this is not really the case; while it is true that 
some of the estimates are consistent in significance and direction across all 
models, a relatively high number are not. In all, there are 16 estimates in each of 
models 1-3, including the party effects; some nine of these show differentiation, 
either in terms of significance or direction of relationship (or both). We have 
highlighted these in the Table for ease of identification. Close examination 
reveals that more often than not the outlier group is the trade unionist one. If we 
only consider party members and party supporters, the main difference between 
the two groups is demographic, whereas, with the exception of left-right 
distance, similar ideological factors drive the two groups to participate. 
Specifically, being less authoritarian, more post-materialist and having clear 
views on the EU all impel respondents to involve themselves in campaign 
activities.  It is also evident that the main area of difference across the groups is 
demography: there is far greater consistency of attitudinal and constituency 
effects. 
 
Conclusion 
To summarise the major findings of this paper, we have seen that, at the 
individual level, members of political parties are far more likely to engage in 
campaign activity on behalf of their preferred party than either non-member 
supporters or members of affiliated trade unions are; however, union members 
generally do more campaign work than non-member supporters. The size of the 
activism gap varies according to the intensity of the form of activity; the more 
intensive an activity is in terms of time and effort implied, the greater the input 
of party members relative to either trade union members or (especially) non-
member supporters. This notwithstanding, at the aggregate level the overall 
impact of campaign work undertaken by non-member supporters and affiliated 
union members might very well be as great (or even greater) as that of party 
members, given the far larger number of people falling into the former two 
population groups. In trying to understand what influences people in each of 
these groups to involve themselves in election campaign activity, we have found 
that the constituency context is likely to be important; at least for party 
members and supporters, it is the case that the closer the constituency race is 
expected to be, the more likely that they will be active. We have also seen that 
political attitudes are generally influential: social liberalism, post-materialism 
and clear-cut feelings about the EU all incline people to be more active in 
election campaigns; perceived left-right distance from the national party 
leadership also inclines party members to participate, though not non-member 
supporters or union members. Beyond this, there is no clear single (or even 
predominant) pattern of social background influence flowing from demographic 
status. 
Unsurprisingly, given that actually joining a party is likely to be an expression of 
greater commitment to it, an individual member is likely to do more than an 
individual supporter. However, given how many more supporters than members 
parties have, the contribution of the former may well outweigh the contribution 
of the latter – something that may remain true even when taking into account 
the fact that members are significantly more prepared to interact with other 
voters (for example, through canvassing) than supporters.  Moreover, those 
supporters who do things for their preferred parties at election time are often 
motivated by many of the same things that motivate those members who help 
out too. Members, then, to borrow from Fisher and his colleagues are not the 
only fruit – and nor is comparing members with supporters (and indeed, in 
Labour’s case, members of affiliated trade unions) like comparing apples and 
oranges.   
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Notes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
i  These items are coded as follows: Gender: 1 (male), 2 (female); Education:  1 (No 
qualifications), 2 (Junior vocational qualifications), 3 (CSE), 4 (GCSE, O levels, etc.), 5 (A levels/ 
Scottish highers), 6 (Higher vocational qualifications), 7 (Graduate); Social grade: 1 (C2DE – ie, 
manual employee) 2 (ABC1 –ie, non-manual employee); Age: Respondent’s age in years, divided 
by 10 to ease interpretation (change for 10-year difference shown), so that it now runs from 0 to 
10; Age squared. 
ii The individual items from which the Liberty-Authority scale is constructed as follows: “Young 
people today don’t have enough respect for traditional values”; “People who break the law should 
be given stiffer sentences”; “For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate 
sentence”; “Schools should teach children to obey authority”; “Censorship of films and 
magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards”. Responses are coded so that 1 is the most 
socially liberal option and 5 the most socially authoritarian option. The resulting scores are 
normalized and multiplied by 10 so that the final scale runs from 0 to 10. Cronbach’s alpha for 
these five items in the party membeship data = .846; in the non-member supporters data it = 
.837; and for the trade union members data it = .849, which indicates consistently high levels of 
scale reliability across the three datasets. iii !Two items (maintaining order in the nation, and fighting unemployment) constitute 
materialist preferences and two items (giving people more say in important government 
decisions, and protecting freedom of speech) constitute post-materialist preferences. 
iv  The winning majority has been divided by 10 to make a change of 1 unit more readily 
interpretable compared to other independent variables in the models.!
v The seven factors that count towards the dependent variable are: liking a party or candidate on 
Facebook, Tweeting something positive for or about the party or candidate, displaying a poster, 
delivering party leaflets, attending public meetings, canvassing voters, and standing as a 
candidate. “Other” has been excluded. Note that we considered whether a weighted dependent 
variable taking into account different costs of activities could be a better choice. However, since 
results were extremely similar to those shown and it was not completely clear what it would 
mean to apply weights to the number of different activities carried out in campaign, we decided 
to present results for the unweighted variable. 
vi  Count variables can be modelled using either negative binomial regression or Poisson 
regression. They both have the same mean structure. The difference between the two is that 
negative binomial also has an extra parameter (alpha) to model over-dispersion (i.e. when the 
conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean). In our case, negative binomial regression 
was deemed more appropriate due to a significant overdispersion in the political participation 
index. The likelihood ratio test (party members: 424.36, 1df, p<0.001; party supporters: 46.86, 1 
df, p<0.001; trade unionists: 249.83, 1 df, p<0.001) comparing the full negative binomial model 
to a Poisson model, shows that alpha is non-zero (Long & Freese, 2006). Working with logistic 
regression types, for ease of interpretation of exp(B) all variables excluding 
demographics/resources have been recoded from 0 to 10.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
vii Similar to odds ratios in binomial logistic regression, IRRs are the exponentials of the negative 
binomial regression coefficients (exp (b)) and they are often used for ease of interpretation. The 
negative binomial regression coefficients have an additive effect in the log(y) scale, while the 
incident-rate ratio coefficients (IRR) have a multiplicative effect in the y scale. 
viii The pseudo R-squared used in this model is McFadden’s Adjusted R2, a measure that shows 
improvement from the null model to the fitted model. Excellent fit is generally considered to be 
between 0.2-0.4. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Social and political characteristics of British political party 
members, 2015. 
Attribute Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP Total 
        
Mean age            M 54 51 51 58 42 49 51 
                              S 57 52 50 56 41 52 52 
                            TU 56 54 55 57 50 53 54 
        
% male                M 71.2 61.6 68.5 75.9 57.5 56.4 65.0 
                              S 51.6 49.6 43.2 55.9 35.9 51.5 48.1 
                            TU 61.9 61.0 54.1 78.2 59.7 61.9 62.9 
        
% graduates       M 37.9 56.3 55.8 23.1 56.4 41.7 45.4 
                              S 25.3 29.8 44.6 13.3 48.5 28.4 31.3 
                            TU 15.9 36.5 34.5 10.6 52.1 34.0 30.8 
        
% ABC1               M 74.6 69.7 76.0 59.9 65.2 61.9 68.2 
                              S 68.6 51.9 67.5 43.0 55.9 46.9 55.7 
                           TU 43.7 53.2 58.2 30.6 58.0 50.5 49.2 
        
Mean left-right M 7.76 2.39 4.10 7.34 1.90 2.96 4.44 
                             S 7.53 2.97 4.40 6.77 2.40 3.65 4.66 
                           TU 6.90 2.87 4.34 6.03 2.11 3.00 4.00 
        
N                          M 1193 1180   730  785  845  963 5696 
                              S 1142 1136 1004 1071 1029  996 6378 
                           TU 252 774 122 216 119 97 1580 
Notes: M: Members, S: Supporters. Left-right (self-location) = mean self-placement on a scale 
running from 0 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing). 
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Table 2: Partisan identification by vote, 2015 
Party Id. Very strong Quite 
Strong 
Not very 
Strong 
Number 
Conservative 95.6 87.9 52.4 6446 
Labour 94.6 83.7 53.4 6658 
Liberal Dem. 66.7 54.4 41.9 1101 
UKIP 78.4 49.6 20.8 1450 
Green 72.3 54.7 17.2 587 
SNP 92.3 68.6 29.2 1746 
 
Note: Each cell reports the percentage of partisan identifiers voting loyally for ‘their’ party at the 
2015 general election. Data source: BES panel study, (post-election) wave 6.  
 
Table 3: Voting preference by party membership, partisan identity, 
and trade union membership, 2015 
  Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP Total 
Members                               90.5 90.7 82.7 88.0 79.1 91.6 87.7 
Supporters                               85.5 86.0 66.9 85.7 66.2 97.0 81.5 
Trade unionists                             15.5 47.5 7.5 13.3 7.3 6.0 97.1 
 
Note: Members = percentage of party members voting loyally for ‘their’ party in 2015; 
Supporters = percentage of non-member party supporters (ie, very strong identifiers) voting 
loyally for ‘their’ party in 2015; Trade unionists = percentage of members of unions affiliated to 
the Labour Party voting for each of the parties in 2015. Data Sources: UK Party Membership 
Survey 2015, Trade Union Members Survey 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Which of the following things did you do for the party during 
the 2015 election campaign? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Activity Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP Total 
‘Liked’ something by     M 39.6 51.1 47.4 44.2 67.6 72.7 53.4 
 party/candidate on       S 10.2 18.8 14.8 17.2 35.5 31.2 21.0 
 Facebook                      TU 9.5 26.9 11.5 14.8 26.9 32.0 21.4 
        
Tweeted/re-tweeted     M                       26.0 36.9 31.1 22.9 45.7 48.6 35.2 
something by party       S 3.4 7.8 7.8 4.4 18.5 10.4 8.6 
or candidate                 TU 3.6 15.1 8.2 4.2 15.1 12.4 10.8 
        
Displayed election         M              29.6 51.2 37.8 42.9 45.1 67.7 45.7 
poster in window          S  2.5  10.7 6.0 8.1 9.5 21.1 9.5 
                                        TU 3.2 23.9 6.6 7.9 16.8 27.8 16.4 
        
Low intensity             M 57.4 75.3 67.4 65.0 80.6 87.6 72.0 
Activities                        S 13.5 26.5 21.9 23.1 43.1 41.9 28.0 
(at least one)                TU 11.9 40.7 18.0 20.8 37.8 45.4 30.5 
        
Delivered leaflets           M 43.5 42.5 45.9 38.3 28.8 35.4 39.4 
                                           S 2.4 3.0 3.8 1.6 2.4 2.6 2.6 
                                        TU 2.0 14.5 4.1 3.7 6.7 5.2 9.2 
        
Attended public             M 31.3 31.4 28.2 40.5 27.3 49.0 34.6 
meeting or hustings      S 4.2 4.8 6.8 3.4 8.7 12.6 6.6 
                                        TU 5.2 16.9 4.9 8.3 13.4 19.6 12.9 
        
Medium intensity    M 52.5 52.2 52.8 51.1 38.5 56.2 51.0 
Activities                       S 6.3 7.0 9.4 4.3 10.3 14.3 8.5 
(at least one)                TU 7.1 22.7 7.4 9.3 16.8 19.6 16.3 
        
Canvassed face to face M 36.5 35.7 32.6 26.1 19.1 28.2 30.4 
or by phone                     S 1.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 4.0 2.4 2.4 
                                        TU 2.0 12.7 0.8 1.9 9.2 9.3 8.0 
        
Stood as candidate       M 9.1 7.0 15.1 13.0 10.2 0.2 8.6 
 (parliamentary or         S  0.6 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 
  local councillor)       TU 0.4 3.5 0.8 0.0 2.5 0.0 2.0 
        
High intensity           M 38.0 37.0 36.0 30.0 23.7 28.2 32.6 
Activities                       S 2.0 2.4 2.8 2.3 4.1 2.4 2.7 
(at least one)                TU 2.0 13.2 1.6 1.9 10.1 9.3 8.4 
        
Activism Index – M 2.15 2.56 2.38 2.28 2.43 3.02 2.47 
Activism Index – S 0.25 0.48 0.42 0.37 0.79 0.80 0.51 
Activism Index – TU 0.26 1.13 0.37 0.41 0.91 1.06 0.81 
 
Number – M 1193 1180 730 785 845 963 5696 
                    - S 1142 1136 1004 1070 1029 996 6337 
                    - TU 252 774 122 216 119 97 1580 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
Note: All activities figures are percentages. Campaign activism index is based on an additive 
scale that runs from 0 (no activity during the election campaign) to 7 (maximal activity during 
the campaign, excluding “other”). M= members; S=supporters; TU= trade unionists. 
 
 
Table 5: Estimates of national totals of party members, very strong 
partisans, and members of Labour-affiliated unions, 2015.  
 Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP  Total 
Members   150000   188000   51000   42000   61000 110000 602000 
Supporters 3061993 3883464 446623 636577 165192 659054 8852903 
T/Unionists   656966 2013284 317887 563719 309410 254310 4115576 
 
Note: ‘Members’ = number of political party members at time of May 2015 general elections, or 
as near as possible thereof. ‘Supporters’ = projected numbers of non-members who are ‘very 
strong’ partisan identifiers for each party, based on BES 2015 Internet Panel (post-election), 
Wave 6.0; the number of party members is then subtracted from this figure in order to avoid 
double-counting, given that most party members are also highly likely to designate themselves 
‘very strong’ partisan identifiers. ‘Trade unionists’ = projected number of members of affiliated 
trade union members that would have voted for each party, based on our Trade Union Members 
Survey, 2015.viii 
 
Table 6: Mean number of campaign activities, weighted by size of 
groups 
 Con. Labour LibDem UKIP Green SNP Total 
Members 322500 481280 121380 95760 148230 332200 1486940 
Supporters 765498 1864063 187582 235533 130502 527243 4514981 
T/Unionists 170811 2275010 117618 231125 281563 269569 3333617 
 
Note: Each figure is the mean number of campaign activities reported by each group (as 
indicated by the campaign activism index in Table 4), multiplied by the estimated number of 
people the group (as reported in Table 5). The figures may therefore be interpreted as the overall 
number of campaign activities conducted by each group.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Explanatory models for Political Participation Breadth 
during the Electoral Campaign 
DV=Party Activism (1) M (2) S (3) TU 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Demographics    
Female 1.011 1.148*** 0.850 
 (0.023) (0.056) (0.093) 
Education level  0.989 1.035** 1.046 
(Qualification) (0.008) (0.016) (0.033) 
ABC1 (vs. CD2E) 0.958 1.006 1.143 
 (0.025) (0.054) (0.127) 
Age 1.261*** 0.874 0.893 
 (0.051) (0.084) (0.276) 
Age squared 0.972*** 1.006 1.010 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.029) 
Ideology    
Left-Right Distance  0.978* 1.050*** 1.040 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.034) 
Liberty-Authority Index 0.964*** 0.960*** 0.875*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.022) 
Post-Materialism Index 1.101*** 1.202*** 1.126 
 (0.022) (0.049) (0.099) 
Clear views on EU  1.120*** 1.213*** 1.379** 
 (0.036) (0.073) (0.179) 
Marginality    
Majority % in 2010 0.982* 0.964* 1.041 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.043) 
Political Party    
Conservative 0.899* 0.353*** 0.425*** 
 (0.038) (0.034) (0.110) 
Labour 0.840*** 0.586*** 1.121 
 (0.030) (0.047) (0.221) 
Lib Dem 0.769*** 0.484*** 0.397*** 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.114) 
UKIP 0.851*** 0.536*** 0.724 
 (0.038) (0.048) (0.176) 
Greens 0.735*** 0.738*** 0.532* 
 (0.029) (0.059) (0.196) 
Constant 2.176*** 0.755 1.199 
 (0.266) (0.218) (1.081) 
Alpha†  0.186*** 0.740*** 1.266** 
 (0.013) (0.068) (0.141) 
    
Log Likelihood -9974.32 -4574.82 -1344.74 
McFadden Adjusted R2 0.016 0.044 0.064 
Observations 5,071 4,763 1,120 
Note: Incident-Rate Ratio (IRR) are displayed, S.e. in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1  
† Alpha is the over-dispersion parameter. If it is significant (as in this case), there is evidence 
that it is different from 0 and therefore that our data is over-dispersed, so a Negative Binomial 
model needs to be used rather than a Poisson model. 
 
 
 
